ndividual motivation. Moreover, these nonschool factors also affect school choices made by families, such that students with one type of background and ability attend public schools, whereas students with different backgrounds and abilities attend private schools. Thus, unless nonschool factors are controlled appropriately, estimates of school effects will be contaminated by what has become known as "selectivity bias." The problem is that the researcher's measures of these factors, particularly those that act as proxies for ability and motivation, are far from perfect.' Modern statistical techniques help in controlling for this bias, although recent research has revealed that it is also important to keep track of one's assumptions in modeling (see Murnane, Newstead, and Olsen 1985 for a careful assessment of the results of Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore and their critics).
Another shortcoming of the available literature is that the causal mechanisms underlying the differences in schooling outcomes for public and private schools have not been analyzed. What do public and private schools actually do that is different? Do they emplQy different input mixes (see Hannaway and Abramowitz 1985, and Chubb and -Moe 1986 for some evidence from the United States)? If not, do they use the same input mix differently? Most important, does this behavior result in differences in the unit cost of providing education?
Finally, previous analyses of public/private school differentials have utilized only cross-sectional data, which do not allow for a direct measure of value added. If the achievement relationship (that is, the educational production function) holds at two points in time, it is possible when measuring outcomes to concentrate on exactly what happens educationally between those points. Differences in achievement can be related to specific inputs over a shorter time period. Moreover, the effect of omitted unmeasured factors, such as student ability or motivation, are lessened in the achievement-value added formulation compared with the level-of-achievement formulation. Any "level" effects of these unmeasured variables have already been incorporated into prior (for example, at the beginning of the school year) achievement. This does not mean that unmeasured variables no longer affect the estimating equation, but their effect is mitigated because only the "growth" effects of omitted variables such as innate ability would influence value added. Technically, the error term of a value added equation does not contain unmeasured personal characteristics that affect achievement similarly in both periods.
This study contributes to the literature in four dimensions. First, it extends the empirical evidence for developing countries by analyzing data from the Second International Mathematics Study (SIMS) conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in Thailand 1. Several studies have attempted to use direct measures of ability based on tests specifically designed to measure innate ability (for example, an I.Q. test) rather than cognitive achievement (Psacharopoulos and Loxley 1985; Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot 1985, among others) . Many analysts have questioned the validity of these tests in distinguishing between ability and achievement. In any case, no one has ever suggested that such tests fully control for both ability and motivation.
during the 1981-82 academic year. The only other rigorous comparisons of achievement in public and private schools in developing countries have been conducted in Kenya (Armitage and Sabot 1987) , Colombia, and Tanzania (Psacharopoulos 1987; Cox and Jimenez 1987) .
Second, to our knowledge, this is one of the first comparative studies, in developing or developed countries, of public versus private achievement that uses longitudinal data. (See Coleman and Hoffer 1987 for a recently published analysis using U.S. data.) In SIMS, students were tested at the beginning and end of the eighth grade school year. Thus we were able to obtain better controls for unmeasured variables because the data base contains a direct measure of value added of a year of schooling. (See Mellow 1981 for a similar evaluation of cross-sectional versus longitudinal estimates using the example of the impact of unions on wages.) Third, the study also confronts the difficult methodological questions that have arisen in other studies. An individual's status as a public or private school student is a choice made by student and parent. If this choice is systematically correlated with personal characteristics, there may be sample selection bias. We use some recent methodological advances to model the effect of student and school characteristics on value added and to control statistically for the possibility of selection bias.
Fourth, we make further inquiries into the nature and consequences of public/private differentials in school achievement. In particular, we document differences in the availability and use of school inputs for public and private schools. Then we compare unit costs of public and private schools, before reaching conclusions on the relative efficiency (as opposed to the relative productivity) of public and private schools.
I. THE BASIC VALUE ADDED MODEL
Factors that affect student achievement can be quantified through the use of statistical inference. The ith pupil's score in the eighth grade mathematics achievement test is characterized by the following equation:
( The terms in equations 1 and 2 are defined as follows. Ai, = achievement score of the ith child at the end of school year t (that is, 7 or 8). Xi, = a vector of variables describing the ith child's learning environment during school year t (for example, out-of-school tutoring, parental encouragement, availability of study materials at home, characteristics of teachers, other school-related characteristics specific to year t, peer characteristics); the vector describing learning environment can be partitioned into a school-related vector (S) and a child or household-related vector (H), or Xi, = [Xi, XitH. Zi = a vector of variables affecting achievement which is invariant over time (for example, quality of the home environment or parental inputs such as parents' education, student's educational expectations, and student characteristics such as sex and age). I, = a vector of variables describing unobserved influences (for example, innate ability or preschool care). The term ui, = a random disturbance term with a zero mean and a variance v 2 . The term a' = a vector of coefficients describing the effect on achievement at the end of the eighth grade of a unit change in the child's environment in school year t (for example, a 7 is the marginal effect on eighth grade achievement of environmental characteristics during the seventh grade). The term b' is similar to a; , but describes the effect on achievement at the end of the seventh grade. The term c' = a vector of coefficients of the effect on eighth grade achievement of a unit change in one of the Z variables. The term d, = the effect on achievement of a unit change in the unobserved component. The prime symbol (') = an indication of a transposition of a column vector to a row vector.
It is not feasible to estimate equation 1 or 2 because researchers rarely have much information on past characteristics, such as class size or parental tutoring four or five years earlier. An alternative is to estimate equations 1 and 2 as value added equations by subtracting equation 2 from equation 1 (see Hanushek 1986 for a more thorough review of the arguments). The resulting equation could greatly simplify the specification if some of the Xi, terms are canceled out. However, for this to happen, additional assumptions are necessary. Boardman and Murnane (1979) have demonstrated the importance of deriving the empirical form of the value added equations carefully because each specification imposes behavioral restrictions.
The specifications in equations 1 and 2 imply that school and student characteristics in previous years also affect current achievement. For example, the size of a student's class in the seventh grade on down to the first grade affects his/her eighth grade achievement. However, we do not expect characteristics in previous years to have the same effect on current-period achievement as current-period characteristics. A more reasonable expectation is that the effect of past characteristics on current achievement diminishes over time. If this effect diminishes geometrically, then a simple value added equation can be derived from equations 1 and 2.
Let the unsubscripted variables a, c, and d represent the "true" current-period effect on school achievement of a unit change in a component of X, Z and I, respectively. For example, a is the effect on eighth grade achievement of an increase in one unit of class size during the eighth grade, or a, = a. Letf be the amount by which the effect of seventh grade characteristics on eighth grade achievement diminishes relative to a, or a 7 = (f )a. 2 The critical assumption is 2. We would expectf < 1. However, this is not a restriction becausef is a parameter to be estimated. In the unlikely event that the estimated f > 1, we conclude that past characteristics have greater importance than current-period characteristics in explaining current achievement.
that the effect of previous years diminishes geometrically thereafter, or a 6 = (f 2 )a, ..., a, = (f 7 )a, forJ < 1. By similar reasoning, the impact of previous years' characteristics on seventh grade achievement is b 7 = a, b 6 = (f )a, ... , b, = (f 6 )a. These definitions can then be substituted into equations 1 and 2. Then, if equation 2 is multiplied by f before it is subtracted from equation 1, and terms are canceled out, the following simple specification is obtained: This estimating equation is intuitively appealing because the terms describing previous environments (X, t = 1, ..., 7) are deleted and the (unrestricted) coefficient of A, 7 can be easily interpreted as f.
In this study we use equation 3 as the final estimating form. However, several econometric issues require further discussion. First, it is important to distinguish between variables that change during the eighth grade (and thus belong to the X vector) and those that are invariant over the child's schooling career (and thus belong to the Z vector). The coefficient of a Z-type variable (such as student sex) cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect on eighth grade achievement; rather, the coefficient is the marginal effect on eighth grade achievement less its effect on achievement in the seventh grade.
Second, the use of the lagged dependent variable in equation 3 could introduce technical problems: Ai 7 has a random component, and it may be correlated with the error term. We can invoke additional restrictions regarding the error structure to address these problems. 3 Moreover, we argue that regardless of these restrictions, any remaining technical biases would not change our main results regarding differential achievement of private and public schools because both types of schools would be equally affected.
Third, the use of value added does not necessarily make the problem of omitting unobserved variables go away-although we would expect the problem to be mitigated. The problem is important if variables such as ability and motivation are correlated with the X and Z terms (for example, more able children are given more attention at school and at home). The coefficient of the measured variable would be biased upward or downward, depending on its correlation with the unmeasured I variable. Because we are focusing on one particular environmental effect-the public versus private dimension-the problem can be couched in terms of selection bias. If students are systematically selected (or self-selected) into public or private schools on the basis of some unobserved criterion (such as ability), estimates of achievement within each 3. We assume that this year's persistent error will be some fraction of last year's persistent error (that observations with large positive or negative errors this year will be likely next year to have errors closer to zero-smaller in absolute value, or U,, = uU, 7 , where u < 1). If u = f, then that part of the error term in equation 3 that contains the persistent effects collapses to a random variable with zero mean and the autocorrelation problem is solved. In any event, the bias associated with autocorrelation of the persistent effects ought to be empirically quite small and should be dominated by the random component and our large sample (see Theil 1971, chap. 8). school type would be contaminated by this selection effect. This problem is corrected using recently developed statistical techniques.
II. DATA

Sample
The IEA SIMS sample comprised 99 mathematics teachers and their 4,030 eighth grade students and was derived from a two-stage, stratified random sample of classrooms. The primary sampling units were the twelve national educational regions of Thailand plus Bangkok. Within each region, a random sample of lower-secondary schools was selected, along with replacements. At the second stage, a random sample of one class per school was selected from a list of all eighth grade mathematics classes within the school. The resulting sample represented 1 percent of eighth grade mathematics classrooms within each region. This article reports data on the 3,265 students for whom complete data were available.
A mathematics test covering five curriculum content areas (arithmetic, algebra, geometry, statistics, and measurement) was administered to students at both the beginning (pretest) and end (posttest) of the school year. Students also completed a short background questionnaire at the pretest and a longer one at the posttest administration. Teachers completed several survey instruments at the posttest, including questionnaires on their background, teaching practices, and characteristics of their randomly selected "target" class. Data about the school were provided by a school administrator and were supplemented with information provided by the Ministry of Education.
Mathematics Achievement
The IEA developed five mathematics tests for use in SIMS. One test was a forty-item instrument called the core test. The remaining four tests were thirtyfive-item instruments called rotated forms. These five test instruments contained roughly equal proportions of items from each of the five curriculum content areas, except that the core test contained no statistics items (Wattanawaha 1986) . For the purposes of this analysis, we regard the instruments as parallel forms with respect to mathematics content.
The IEA longitudinal design called for Thai students to be pretested using both the core test and one randomly selected rotated-form test. At the posttest, students again took the core test and a rotated-form test different from that taken at the pretest. Approximately equal numbers of students took each of the rotated-form tests in both test administrations.
One goal of our analysis was to predict posttest achievement as a function of pretest performance plus other determinants. Because students took the core form twice, the core-form posttest scores reflect, to some degree, familiarity with the core-test items. Thus we analyzed scores from the rotated forms, after they were equated to adjust for differences in test length and difficulty. In this analysis, we used equated rotated-form formula scores for both pretest and posttest measures of student mathematics achievement. A complete description of the equating procedure is provided in Lockheed, Vail, and Fuller (1986) .
Student Background Characteristics
To conform with the value added model outlined above, student characteristics were divided into two categories: time-invariant or fixed (Z,) and variable or eighth grade specific (X,,H). Fixed background information about each student included sex, age, enrollment in a coeducational or single-sex school, number of older siblings, maternal educational status, paternal occupational status, 4 educational expectations, and correspondence between home language and language of instruction. Definitions and categories for each of these variables are provided in table 1.
Student characteristics thought to vary over the course of the school year include amount of out-of-school tutoring, perceived parental encouragement, and home use of a four-function calculator (a proxy for family educational resources). Parental encouragement was measured by an index comprising four items of the type "My mother thinks that learning mathematics is very important for me," with a five-point Likert-type response alternative ranging from 1 = "exactly like" to 5 = "not at all like." On this index, a low score represents high parental encouragement.
Peer Group, Class, Teacher, and School Characteristics
We use three measures of a student's peer group characteristics: average pretest score, proportion of classmates whose mothers have more than a primary-school education, and proportion of classmates whose fathers have professional occupations. Class characteristics include class size, "enriched" or "nonenriched" curriculum, and single-sex or coeducational mathematics class (as opposed to the school). Teacher background characteristics include sex and participation in in-service training. Teacher classroom teaching practices include using workbooks, maintaining discipline, and administering tests and quizzes. School characteristics include regional per capita income, school size, public or private status, single-sex or coeducational status, and proportion of teachers certified to teach mathematics. Definitions and categories for these variables are provided in the discussion of the nature of the public/private school differential.
4. Because the correlations between paternal and maternal occupational status (r = 0.39) and paternal and maternal educational attainment (r = 0.58) were high, we analyzed the effects of paternal occupational status and maternal educational attainment only. There were also fewer missing cases for these variables. 
III. THE EFFECT OF BACKGROUND ON ACHIEVEMENT IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
A critical policy issue is whether a student randomly chosen from the general population would do better in a public or a private school. According to table 1, the average test score is 24 percent higher at the beginning of eighth grade and 12 percent higher at the end of eighth grade for students in private schools than for students in public schools. These magnitudes imply that the gross measure of value added during eighth grade-posttest less pretest scores-is higher for public schools. However, because students in public and private schools are different, these gross figures should not used to conclude that one school type is more or less effective than the other.
For two reasons, the impact of background on achievement gain can reinforce or counteract the private/public differential, as measured by gross value added. First, it is not unambiguously clear that students from one type of school (public or private) have characteristics that would give them an advantage in mathematics achievement gain (as opposed to achievement level) over students in the other type of school. Several indicators from our sample do point to a slight background advantage for students in private schools, which charge higher fees. Approximately 48 percent of public school students had fathers with blue collar, semiskilled occupations, and 23 percent had fathers with white collar, clerical occupations, compared with 24 percent and 42 percent, respectively, for private school students. Also, a greater proportion of private school students than public school students had mothers with a secondary-school education or above (25 percent versus 15 percent) and had higher expectations regarding further education (28 percent of them expected to attend eight more years of schooling, that is, finish college, as opposed to 21 percent for public school students). These differences are reflected in the private school students' access to extra-school inputs: more home use of calculators and outof-school tutoring. However, private school students perceived receiving less parental encouragement for mathematics. A priori, therefore, we cannot be certain how background will affect achievement gain.
Second, even if private school students come from more advantaged backgrounds, such characteristics could still reverse the uncorrected advantage of public schools in achievement gain (as opposed to achievement level). If the impact of background on achievement diminishes at higher grades, the achievement gain of the school type attended by advantaged students would be understated. For example, suppose that private school students enjoyed an unambiguous background advantage relative to public school students. Holding constant for background would increase private school achievement gain relative to that in public schools.
Thus, the impact of background on achievement gain is complex and cannot be gleaned from a simple comparison of average indicators. In the next section we show our method for taking the impact of background into account.
Controlling for Background
To control for student or household characteristics (such as socioeconomic status and ability) when comparing achievement test scores, we use the value added achievement model developed earlier. We estimate equation 3 separately for students in public and private schools, under the assumption that they come from different populations':
where the symbols -and ^ represent private and public schools, respectively. Note that only the household subvector (subscripted by H) of X is of concern in this section.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on equations 3a and 3b for public and private school students might lead to misleading results because of selection bias. Suppose that students are free to choose the type of school they prefer. One type of selection results if students sort themselves into the type of institution they think will maximize their performance. There would be positive selection in both private and public school samples. Another alternative is that students are hierarchically sorted. For example, if there is excess demand for enrollment in public schools and the best students are selected, there would be positive selection into public schools but negative selection into private ones. In neither case can the analyst observe the characteristics of private school students among the public school sample or vice versa. Because the subsamples would not be a random draw from the student population, the assumptions of the basic linear model could lead to biased estimates of the achievement effect. 6 To correct for sample selection, we use the standard two-step methodology (see Heckman 1979; Lee 1979; and Willis and Rosen 1979 for theory and applications). The first step in this methodology is to estimate what determines the choice of type of school. We assume that individuals (typically parents) will choose an educational plan, including the selection of public or private school, that maximizes the child's lifetime earnings, net of tuition costs. The solution 5. Alternatively, equation 3 can be estimated as one equation, with a dummy variable for private and public schools. However, statistical (F-) tests lead us to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of all the other variables are equivalent in both types of schools. Results are available from the authors.
6. The presence of I as a component of e is the critical factor in this problem. If there were no unmeasurable influences on achievement, or if unmeasurable effects were uncorrelated with school type, as well as with other components of Z and X, there would be no selection bias. Present samples would be random draws from the population. Of course, costly strict experimental designs would also obviate this problem (that is, if students were assigned randomly to public and private schools). Also, the selectivity correction does not address any possible problems caused by the lagged dependent variable (see footnote 3).
to this problem can be shown to result in the following choice equation for the ith child (Cox and Jimenez 1987 The estimated equations 5a and 5b are similar to equations 3a and 3b except for the inclusion of the last term. The term Xi is a Mills ratio: the numerator is the ordinate of the standard normal at J,, and the denominator is the probability of being in the sample; both are calculated from the first-stage probit equation. Including Xi in equations 5a and 5b enables us to treat the selection bias as an omitted-variable problem. Then Xi times its OLS coefficient g 4 can be interpreted as the direction and magnitude of selection bias in each of the public and private school achievement equations. The estimation of equations 3a and 3b by OLS would be consistent (unbiased) because, in theory, the equations hold constant for the probability of being selected in one subsample or another. 8 7. This result is now well established in the literature (see Heckman 1979; Lee 1979; Willis and Rosen 1979) . Madalla (1983) has called the version of the procedure used here a switching regression model.
8. This can be shown as follows:
, where a.. represents the covariance between the error terms of the choice and achievement equations, aw is the standard error of the choice equation, andf(.) and F(.) are, respectively, the probability and cumulative density functions of the choice equation. The last expression can be rewritten as g 4 X 4 , where g4 = (a /oar) and
where g4 = (aa,/a,) and X 4 = {'}' Note that, by definition, X4 > 0 and X 4 < 0. These definitions, consistent with those in Willis and Rosen (1979) , are used by our software package.
What Determines the Choice of School Type?
The first step in the estimation technique is to perform a regression analysis of private school choice with variables that measure socioeconomic characteristics of the student and coeducational/single-sex school type. The results are presented in table 2. The most significant variables in determining private school choice are home language and school type (that is, single sex or coeducational) by sex of student. One strong effect on the choice of private schools is a correspondence between the home language and the language of instruction. Another strong effect is related to the interaction between student sex and a student's prior decision to attend a single-sex or coeducational school. Girls who selected single-sex schools are more likely to choose private schools, whereas girls who selected coeducational schools tend to choose public schools. Whether the school is single-sex or coeducational appears to have little effect on male choice of private or public schools, however. When student sex and single-sex/coeducational school type are held constant, few other background characteristics have an effect on choice. Paternal occupational status is inconsistently related to school choice: in comparison with students whose fathers are employed in unskilled occupations, students with fathers in white collar, clerical occupations are more likely to choose private schools whereas those with fathers in skilled, blue collar occupations are less likely to do so. Maternal education has no effect on private school choice. Thus the relationship between parental status and choice of school is not strictly monotonic, and low socioeconomic status groups are well represented in private schools. There is thus likely to be a great variance in the quality of private institutions, a point that is discussed further in the next section. Finally, first-born children tend to be enrolled in public schools, as are older students, suggesting that repetition rates may be higher in public schools. The parameters of the probit equation presented in table 2 can now be used to estimate the term that will be used to correct for the selection bias. The average X in equations 5a and Sb is shown in the penultimate row of table 1.
How Does Socioeconomic Background Affect School Achievement?
The variables used to explain achievement scores in Thailand (that is, the vectors X,,, and Zj) include many of the same variables used in table 2 to explain choice of private or public school. However, the variables represented by X8iH should affect achievement scores only, because the choice of a private or a public school was made well before the student started eighth grade. The Xi8H set includes variables that measure parental encouragement of mathematics, out-of-school tutoring during eighth grade, and the availability at home of instructional aids such as calculators.
Although very few classes in this sample are from single-sex schools or grade levels (five private schools, thirteen public schools), considerably more mathematics classes are single sex (eight in private schools and twenty-two in public schools). After holding student sex and single sex/coeducational school type constant, we expect to find systematic differences in test scores between boys and girls in single-sex and coeducational classes. We expect that girls will profit from single-sex classes, whereas boys will profit from coeducational classes, other things being equal. This expectation is based on previous research documenting sex differences in teacher-student and peer interaction in coeducational mathematics classes (see Lockheed and others 1985 for a recent review). Thus, coeducational status in the classroom (and its interaction with student sex) is included in the list of explanatory variables of achievement. This implies that coeducational status in the school (or grade level) acts as the exclusion restriction that enables us to identify the probit and achievement equations.
Finally, the achievement equation includes a term that holds constant for the selection bias, that is, for the probability that a given student will be in a private school. This term is derived from parameters in the choice equation, as described earlier.
The estimated achievement equations 3a and 3b are presented in table 3 for private and public school students, respectively. These equations can be used to estimate whether a school achievement advantage exists in the public or private sector, after holding constant for student background and private or public school selection. As explained earlier, the interpretation of the coefficients of the stock variables (Z,) differs from that of the flow variables (Xis,) . The effects of the stock variables are nonmarginal; they represent the cumulative effects on past achievement as well: c(1 -f ), where f is the lagged effect of previous inputs on current-year achievements. The estimate off is 0.73 for private schools and 0.78 for public schools.
Students whose fathers were in skilled jobs tended to do better than students whose fathers were in unskilled occupations. However, those with fathers in professional or clerical jobs did not score significantly higher. These trends hold for both public and private school students. Mother's educational attainment (reference category: no education) and student's educational expectation (reference category: less than five more years of school) variables are all insignificant for the private school subsample but are significant and generally exhibit the expected positive sign for the public school subsample. One expla-nation for this difference is that private school students are relatively homogeneous-once they have chosen private schools, home environment does not affect achievement. They may also be more highly motivated than public school students, and a "marginal increment" in motivation will not be as important in affecting achievement. Older students outperform younger students in both public and private schools, but being the eldest child in the family has no effect on achievement. Speaking the language of instruction at home is negatively related to achievement for both groups. (One possible explanation is that Chinese-speaking students do better in school than Thai-speaking students, although we had no data on ethnicity to test this hypothesis.) Boys in coeducational classes do better in mathematics than both boys and girls in single-sex classes; the differences are particularly pronounced in private institutions. However, within private coeducational institutions boys do not outperform girls, and within public coeducational institutions boys only slightly outperform girls. Thus, the male advantage in mathematics performance is sensitive to classroom setting. Table 3 also presents regression results for three flow variables: out-of-school tutoring, parental encouragement, and home use of a four-function calculator. None of these variables has a significant effect on achievement.
The selection term (coefficient of Lambda times its mean) is negative for private schools and positive for public schools. This indicates that, if any school system "skims the cream," it is the public schools. Whereas private school students tend to come from slightly more elevated social status (clerical workers), the effect of parental occupational status is apparently offset by other variables, principally educational aspirations.
With Background Held Constant, Is There a Private School Effect?
The estimated differential in public and private school students' achievement scores can be computed from the parameters presented in table 3 to hold constant for the effect of background. Because private and public school achievement equations differ in terms of intercept and slope, the comparison would be affected by the values of the other explanatory variables, as well as by the coefficients in these equations. To clarify this, we compute the following unconditional private school effect: From the entire sample of private and public students, consider a randomly chosen pupil with the average characteristics of a public school student (that is, standardized according to the public school means). The unconditional effect measures the increment (or decrement) in the student's test score had the student gone to a private school. 9 The same calculations can be performed standardizing at the private school means. The question then would be, how would a pupil with the average characteristics of a private school student have done had he/she gone to public school? There is 9. This unconditional effect nets out the selection term from both the public and private school equations in calculating school effects. In contrast, the conditional private school effect retains the selection term in calculating school effects.
no theoretical reason to prefer one method of standardization over another. However, there is no guarantee that the results will be consistent with one another. The results are summarized in table 4.
The results presented in the top panel of table 4 indicate that, after holding constant for past achievement and socioeconomic background, eighth grade students in private schools have an unconditional advantage in mathematics test performance of about fifteen points. This implies that a Thai eighth grade student with the background of an average private school student, chosen randomly from the population, would more than double his/her score on a mathematics achievement test if that student attended a private school instead of a public one. The private school advantage is slightly more pronounced for those in coeducational institutions. To check the robustness of this result, we calculated the private school effect for a randomly chosen student with the average public school characteristics. The results, shown on the lower panel of table 4, are not substantially different.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIFFERENTIAL
The previous section showed that private school students in Thailand score higher in mathematics achievement scores at the end of eighth grade than do their public school counterparts, after controlling for previous achievement, socioeconomic background, and systematic selection by school type. For policymakers, the remaining question is, what accounts for this achievement differential? Is it possible to identify characteristics of private schools that contribute most to the private school achievement effect? What do administrators and teachers do that is different? What is the influence of a student's peers on relative achievement? Can any lessons regarding the input mix be applied to public schools? This section attempts to answer some of these questions for Thailand. The method is to redo the estimates of the previous section. This time, however, the full achievement equation (equation 3), including school characteristics, is estimated; that is, both components of Xi 8 = [Xi, H X,8] , in addition to Z,, are included in the equation. We then discuss how the school-specific components in these vectors of explanatory variables affect achievement in the public and private sectors. Table 5 presents, for private and public schools, the mean values of the school, classroom, teacher, and peer group attributes that are used in the estimation procedure. They indicate some basic differences between private and public schools in teaching methods and administration. Also, private schools appear advantaged in two respects and disadvantaged in a third. On the one hand, private schools are, on average, half the size of public schools-suggesting greater individualization of programs-and they are located in regions with per capita incomes 30 percent higher than those in which public schools are located-suggesting greater access to resources. On the other hand, fewer than 10 percent of the teachers in private schools, compared with 61 percent of the teachers in public schools, are certified to teach mathematics.
Differences in Peer Group and School Attributes
Characteristics of teachers and their teaching practices differ between public and private schools. A higher proportion of students in private schools have older, and therefore possibly more experienced teachers. The proportion of students with female teachers is higher in private than in public schools. A higher proportion of students in the private subsample have teachers who have undergone some in-service training. Unfortunately, the data do not contain a great deal of additional information regarding the individual teachers of the sampled students.
There is a fair amount of information regarding teaching practices. Teachers of students in private schools tend to spend more time maintaining order in the classroom and giving tests and quizzes. Students in public schools tend to rely a little less on commercially produced teaching materials such as workbooks. However, the differences for these variables are not substantial.
The mathematics classes included in the sample differ for public and private schools. A higher proportion of private students are in enriched mathematics classes, and the size of mathematics classes is larger in private schools. The rough picture provided by this comparison of means is that teachers in private schools have fewer credentials, on average, than their public school counterparts. However, their students are more heavily exposed to in-class work and exercises. Private school students also have an advantage over public school students in terms of the learning environment provided by peer groups. In the the next two subsections, we investigate how these differences in characteristics and teaching practices translate into differences in achievement gain.
Peer Group Effects
Because students interact with each other in school, the ability and socioeconomic status of fellow students could affect individual achievement. To account for this possibility, we reran the achievement equations with the addition of three classroom-level variables: average pretest score, proportion of mothers with greater than a primary-school education, and proportion of fathers with professional occupations. The results of this regression, displayed in the first four columns of table 6, show that average schoolmate pretest score is highly correlated with the individual's posttest score, but that the social class background of peers is unrelated to achievement. In order to determine the extent to which peer groups affect the private/ public differential, we computed the unconditional private school effect for a randomly chosen student with the average background and the average peer group characteristics of private school students. A comparison of the first panel of table 7 with that of table 4 reveals that private/public differentials decline to about 5 points after peer group characteristics are taken into account. This result is robust with respect to a public or private reference group. We conclude that peer groups can account for a substantial part (but not all) of the difference between public and private school achievement.
School Practices and Achievement Gain
The reestimation of the student achievement functions includes the additional variables listed in table 5. As before, private and public school functions are estimated separately. Aside from statistical reasons for not assuming homogeneity of slope and intercept coefficients, separate estimations reflect the fact that unmeasured management practices and "school culture" could differ between public and private schools. Teachers and administrators in public and private schools probably face entirely different sets of incentives. Thus, we expect the coefficients of each of the school-or teacher-related variables to differ for public and private school students.
The coefficients are presented in table 6; they demonstrate considerable differences in effects for public and private students. After holding individual student characteristics constant, district-level per capita income is positively correlated with achievement in public schools only. This may be due to local contributions to school maintenance, or the variable may capture the effect of the availability of ancillary public services that may influence achievement, such as electricity or running water. In any case, public school students who go to school in richer communities do better; community wealth has no effect on private school student achievement.
Students in small private schools do better than those in large ones, but school size has no effect on achievement of public school students. Not surprisingly, the effect of class size is insignificant, because the average class size (over 40 students) for both public and private schools is well outside the range of class sizes which are positively associated with increased student achievement (Glass, McGaw, and Smith 1981) . Also, teaching staff qualifications are not significantly related to achievement in either sector.
Private school students with female teachers outperform those with male teachers; this may reflect a disproportionate utilization of male teachers in the low-performing all-male private schools. Students in enriched mathematics classes outperform students in regular or remedial classes, but the effects are significant for public school students only. Finally, more teacher time devoted to maintaining order is positively related to achievement in private schools but negatively related in public schools, possibly because public school classes in which teachers have to spend a large amount of time maintaining order are "problem" classes. In-service teacher training is unrelated to student achievement.
Is there still a private school effect even after differences in teaching practices and school characteristics are held constant? The answer is yes, according to the second panel of table 7, which measures achievement gain by the same method as applied in the previous section. Although the achievement advantage of private schools is lessened with the addition of these variables, there is still a residual effect of a half point, on average. This effect is substantial (over 3 points) for students in female single-sex schools, who benefit most from private schooling. This remaining private/public school differential indicates that there are unmeasured differences (such as in employee incentives) between private and public schools that influence achievement. These findings need to be qualified, however, because the calculation is sensitive to the choice of the public or private reference point.
V. UNIT COSTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
The previous sections show that private schools are more effective than public schools, even after holding constant for characteristics of students as well as their peers. The bulk of the effect is attributable to measured differences in input mixes (including teaching practices). A critical question is whether more effective schools are also necessarily costlier. Cost data imply that the answer is an emphatic no.
It was not possible to obtain actual expenditure data for the schools in the IEA SIMS sample. We did, however, obtain data on school-level income. Under the assumption that schools spend all of their income, income data can be used to estimate total costs per school. Data on the following categories of income were provided for the same academic year in which the tests were administered: support from the government, fees, material donations, cash donations, and student scholarships. From the school-level data, we computed unit costs (see table 8 ), which were substantially lower for private schools (1,762 baht) than for public schools (4,492 baht). This result holds for single-sex and coeducational institutions. We conclude that private schools are more cost-effective than public schools.
The cost estimates are obviously rough. On the one hand, some schools (particularly private ones) might save a portion of their budget. If so, costs would be overestimated and this would strengthen our conclusion about the cost-effectiveness of private schools. On the other hand, private Catholic schools' budgets may not reflect their actual costs; for example, Catholic schools often rely heavily on teaching clergy, whose salaries substantially understate their market value, and facilities may be subsidized by the church (Levin 1987) . If so, private school costs would be underestimated. Moreover, it was not possible to ascertain whether some of the income categories were for earmarked one-time expenditures (such as contributions to a building fund). If there are systematic differences in categorization for public and private schools, the cost estimates could change-but probably not enough to overturn the relative costeffectiveness of the results.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article provides evidence for Thailand regarding the relative effects of private and public schools in enhancing eighth grade mathematics achievement. An important issue in such comparisons is how to control for the effect of selection into public or private schools, as well as the direct effect of background on achievement. This article uses pre-eighth grade and post-eighth grade test scores to estimate value added equations for private and public schools, as well as statistical corrections for selection. Although selection biases are mitigated in value added formulations of achievement functions (as opposed to level-of-achievement formulations), they are still significant in Thailand. For the sample in this analysis, there appears to be positive selection into public schools and negative selection into private schools-that is, individuals who are more likely to score higher, due to background and student characteristics, go into public schools rather than private schools. The analysis indicates that it is important to test the robustness of simple comparisons of public/private differentials before making policy recommendations.
A principal conclusion is that students in private schools perform significantly better than their public school counterparts, after holding constant for selection and background factors. Thus, private schools are more "effective" in enhancing achievement. The natural next question is at what cost? Unit costs in private schools are, on average, much lower than unit costs in public schools. Combined with the finding regarding the positive private school achievement effect, this implies that private schools are also relatively more cost-effective (that is, efficient) than public schools.
The assumptions need to be tested with other data, and the results need to be replicated in other settings before they are used to make general policy recommendations. The estimated differentials, although generally large, do vary. Nevertheless, this study shows what is possible in Thailand. When budgetary constraints limit the public sector's ability to provide enough places for everybody at some levels of schooling, private schools can be considered as a cost-effective option to respond to growing demand, at least for those who can afford them. Subsidized public places could then be improved and directed to the needy.
Cost-effective private schools can also be analyzed to see if any lessons can be transferred to public schools to improve their performance. In this study, private schools tended to thrive even though they were relatively less endowed with measurable inputs, such as the proportion of faculty certified to teach mathematics. Classroom practices (time spent maintaining order and doing classroom exercises) appeared to be important explanations for the private school advantage.
It may not be possible to capture the whole private school advantage simply by mimicking the measurable characteristics of private schools. Even after measured inputs are held constant, a small private school advantage persists, particularly for females in single-sex schools. This indicates that there are unmeasured but nonetheless important managerial incentives and practices in the (female single-sex) private system that result in enhanced achievement. More work is needed to identify these sources of gains in efficiency.
